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The field of complex litigation continues to grow as both an academic study and a
popular phenomenon. One cannot escape news accounts of major class action liti-
gation, and lawyers continue to find new ways to push the outer bounds of civil
litigation practices to accommodate large-scale disputes involving multiple claims
or parties. Many question whether traditional procedures can or should apply to
these cases. Drawing on this well-recognized procedural tension, this Article ex-
plores the relationship between trial and appellate courts in complex litigation and
argues for a revised standard of appellate review for trial court decisions affecting
the party structure of a lawsuit. The Article examines historical equity practices
and modern principles of administrative law to explain the function of a trial
court in complex litigation and to justify the form of appellate scrutiny that is ap-
plicable to that role.
INTRODUCTION
In his moving first-person account of the work leading up to the
1995 Dayton Peace Accords, Richard Holbrooke describes the only
feasible resolution to his diplomatic mission in the former Yugosla-
via: "The three Balkan Presidents would soon have to be brought
together in an all-or-nothing, high-risk negotiation."' Holbrooke's
intuition is the same instinct that informs much of what is often
called complex litigation. The notion is that complicated disputes
require bringing together everyone in a single lawsuit.2 Many pro-
visions of the current Federal Rules of Civil Procedure adopt, at
least implicitly, this emphasis.3 Even before the adoption of the
* J.D., summa cum laude, Notre Dame Law School, 2002; B.A., summa cum laude,
DePauw University, 1999. Thanks to Jay Tidmarsh for his helpful suggestions on an earlier
draft of this work and to my good friend Ryan Danks for more insight-filled conversations
than I care to remember. Most importantly, thanks to my familyJenni, Seth, and Elijah; they
may not have read this Article, but without them, I'd have no words to write.
1. RICHARD HOLaROOKE, To END A WAR 185 (1998).
2. Cf Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Consolidation Conundrum, 1995 BYU L. REV.
879,880 ("[T] he [American Law Institute Complex Litigation] Project's principal thrust was
to remove obstacles to consolidation.").
3. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 18(a) (permittingjoinder of "as many claims... as the party
has against an opposing party."); FED. R. Civ. P. 19 (concerning "joinder of persons needed
for just adjudication"); FED. R. Civ. P. 20(a) (permitting joinder of all persons with whom or
against whom there are asserted "rightls] to relief jointly, severally, or in the alternative");
FED. R. Civ. P. 24(b) (permitting a party to intervene if, among other things, the "applicant's
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Federal Rules, and before any widespread conception of "complex
litigation," the procedures of equity advanced a similarly all-
inclusive view ofjustice.4
But bringing everyone together in a single lawsuit is not always
possible. In our judicial system, parties exercise great control over
the course of their litigation. 5 As such, many of thejoinder devices
available under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rely on the
parties to invoke them.6 Therefore, while bringing everyone to-
gether may serve the interests of 'Justice" in some abstract sense,
an individual litigant may choose not to pursue joinder if it does
not advance her interests. In particular, joining large numbers of
parties into a single piece of litigation can give it some of the same
"all-or-nothing" or "high risk" features that produced the Dayton
Peace Accords,7 features that may make it undesirable to the par-
ticipants (in addition to considerations of expense, manageability,
and various other strategic calculations). Also, parties sometimes
face difficulties knowing who needs to be joined in a particular
lawsuit.8 Further, even if the system could identify every interested
party, and even if the original litigants wanted to include all of
these people, the laws of personal and subject matter jurisdiction
may make completejoinder impossible. 9
This tension-the policy in favor of complete joinder as against
legal doctrines and other forces that inhibit it-is the basic stuff of
claim or defense and the main action have a question of law or fact in common."); FED. R.
Civ. P. 42(a) (permitting courts to order consolidation or joint proceedings when "actions
involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court").
4. See NEW EQUITY RULES OF 1912, R. 26, reprinted in JAMES LOVE HOPKINS, THE NEW
FEDERAL EQUITY RULES 178 (6th ed. 1929) ("The plaintiff may join in one bill as many
causes of action, cognizable in equity, as he may have against the defendant."). See generally
Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Bills of Peace with Multiple Parties, 45 HARV. L. REV. 1297 (1932) (dis-
cussing the equitable bill of peace).
5. See JAY TIDMARSH & ROGER H. TRANGSRUD, COMPLEX LITIGATION AND THE ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 87-88 (1998) (describing the plaintiffs autonomy as "master of the complaint" and
exploring the relationship of that doctrine to complex litigation).
6. See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24 ("Upon timely application anyone shall be permitted to
intervene in an action ... ."). But see FED. R. Civ. P. 21 ("Parties may be dropped or added by
order of the court.., of its own initiative ....").
7. SeeHOLBROOKE, supra note 1, at 185.
8. This has been a particular problem in the asbestos litigation, where many people
were exposed to asbestos, but not everyone had developed an injury by the time of various
lawsuits. SeenAmchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (affirming the reversal of a
class certification where the class action was brought as a global settlement and the pur-
ported class was to include future claimants).
9. The American Law Institute ("ALI") has argued that "[i]f the unitary resolution of
related elements of complex cases is to be achieved, there must be effective jurisdiction ...
mechanisms," including special nationwide jurisdictional statutes for complex cases. AM.
LAW INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND ANALYSIS § 3.08 cmts. a
& e (1994).
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any study in complex litigation.' ° Examining the intricacies of that
tension yields, like so many legal dilemmas, more questions than
answers." I wish to explore in these pages a narrower tension: that
between trial courts and appellate courts in complex cases. Some
of the literature emphasizes that complex cases are "different"
from standard litigation. But complex cases do not occur in a dif-
ferent court system. Nor, ordinarily, are they judged under
different procedural rules. 3 These cases, like all others, often work
their way through trial courts, intermediate appellate courts, and
possibly courts of last resort, with each weighing in on the ques-
tions that are unique to complex litigation. When a multitude of
courts with varying relationships to one another try to resolve is-
sues that are, by definition, "complex," it creates an additional
layer of complexity. Lawyers, judges, and litigants trying to under-
stand complex litigation face a cacophony of voices. Often these
voices speak from different vantage points and try to advance dif-
fering agendas.
4
10. See, e.g., RICHARD L. MARCUS & EDWARD F. SHERMAN, COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES
AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED CIVIL PROCEDURE (3d ed. 1998); TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra
note 5.
11. Even Professors Tidmarsh and Trangsrud, who offer an ambitious look at both the
principles of the adversarial system and the unique needs of complex litigation informed by
a targeted (and probably accurate) definition of complex litigation, see TIDMARSH & TRANGS-
RUD, supra note 5, at 85-86, still do not offer any solutions to the "dysfunction" they identify
as the principal problem of complex litigation. Id. at v-vi.
12. See, e.g., Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281, 1284 (1976) ("The characteristic features of the public law model are very different
from those of the traditional model.").
13. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure govern all actions in federal courts, FED. R.
CIV. P. 1, but complex cases do enjoy some unique procedures. For example, under 28
U.S.C. § 1407, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation is empowered to transfer "civil
actions involving one or more common questions of fact ... pending in different districts"
to a single federal court for "coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1407(a) (2000).
14. One federal appellate court, in vacating and remanding a lower court's decision,
recognized this tension:
We recognize and are sympathetic to the burdens placed on trial judges by cases in-
volving multiple parties and multiple lawyers. It is fine for commentators and
appellate courts to speak of the systemic efficiency of trying one lawsuit in lieu of
many, but a multi-party action obviously does little in the short run to alleviate the
workload of the individual trial judge to whom it is assigned. Instead, the trial judge
faces only the demands of managing a complex proceeding, maintaining order
among many litigants, and assembling a coherent record out of a jumble of plead-
ings, testimony and evidentiary exhibits.... Nevertheless, the judicial system as a
whole benefits substantially when similar complaints are resolved in a single unified
proceeding, and the advantages in terms of efficiency and uniformity are simply too
great to ignore.
Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
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This Article examines the nature of complex litigation and the
powers trial judges exercise over those cases in order to show that
the traditional relationship between trial courts and appellate
courts is inappropriate for complex cases. In particular, I argue
that reviewing courts should apply a more deferential standard of
review to trial judges' joinder determinations.' 5 This conclusion
follows from a brief exploration of the history of judicial discretion
and a borrowed doctrine from administrative law.' 6 Part I describes
the contours of complex litigation and introduces some of the
problems it creates. Part II examines the role of the trial judge in
complex litigation, and Part III outlines my proposal for a new
standard of appellate review inspired by the administrative law doc-
trine of "Chevron deference." 7 The Article concludes by arguing
that an administrative law model is particularly appropriate in light
of the tasks trial judges perform in complex cases. As commenta-
tors have explained in describing a familiar form for complex
litigation, "a class action resembles a 'quasi-administrative proceed-
ing, conducted by the judge.""'
I. WHAT IS COMPLEX LITIGATION AND WHY IS IT A PROBLEM?
A. General Considerations
A thoroughgoing definition and analysis of what is meant by the
phrase "complex litigation" is best left to treatises on the topic.19
But an understanding of the types of cases that warrant a revised
standard of appellate review is one ingredient of my proposal. In
the following paragraphs, I briefly explore the problems of com-
plex litigation, with an eye toward the additional problems for
appellate review that these cases engender. Throughout the Arti-
cle, I will focus principally on the federal courts and on the
'joinder complexity"20 aspect of complex litigation.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Parts IIA., III.
17. See generally Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837
(1984); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J.
511.
18. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (quoting 3B J. MOORE &
J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 23.45 (1984)).
19. E.g., MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 10; TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 5.
20. SeeJay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of
Judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1683, 1780-89 (1992) (describing joinder complexity as
how the constraints of judicial procedure and adversarial ethics "combine to cause either
lawyer or party dysfunction" in the essential task of selecting the party structure of a lawsuit).
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One of the first critical looks at the modern notion of complex
litigation came in Professor Lon Fuller's article, The Forms and Lim-
its of Adjudication.' In this posthumously published piece, Fuller
describes his notion of a "polycentric" problem resembling a spi-
der web, where "[a] pull on one strand will distribute tensions after
a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole."22 For Fuller,
this sort of problem, which many identify with the types of disputes
that comprise "complex litigation, ' is "unsuited to solution by ad-
judication," and must be solved by other means.24 In other words,
Fuller contends that complex litigation does not belong in the ju-
dicial system at all. He reaches this conclusion by exploring the
philosophical essence of the adjudicatory system and its incongru-
ity with the types of disputes he calls polycentric. 25
Abram Chayes, writing in the same time period, took a much
more practical approach: "Whatever its historical validity, the tradi-
tional model [of adjudication] is clearly invalid as a description of
much of current civil litigation ...,26 Instead of focusing on the
theoretical concerns that seemed to drive Fuller, Chayes looked to
"what federal courts and particularly federal trial judges are doing
'in fact.'- 2 7 This view accords with a more recent description of the
federal courts as a "contemporary, complex litigation-laden legal
system., 28 Chayes argued that we should accept the changed reality
of adjudication and focus new energies on shoring up the legiti-
macy of that reality.
2 9
Where Chayes's reality meets (or rather, fails to meet) Fuller's
theory is the basic area of debate regarding complex litigation. On
the one hand, as Chayes emphasizes, much of modern civil litiga-
tion has become "polycentric." Yet, as Fuller eloquently explains,
resolving these disputes can strain the traditional understanding of
judicial business.3 0 The question facing modern commentators is
what to do about it. Some believe the answer lies in procedural
21. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
22. Id. at 395.
23. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1729.
24. Fuller, supra note 21, at 398.
25. See, e.g., id. at 400 ("Generally speaking, it may be said that problems in the alloca-
tion of economic resources present too strong a polycentric aspect to be suitable for
adjudication.").
26. Chayes, supra note 12, at 1283-84.
27. Id. at 1282.
28. In reGen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 E3d 768, 783 (3d
Cir. 1995).
29. SeeChayes, supra note 12, at 1312-16.
30. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 21 at 394-400 (discussing polycentric problems and "the
limits of adjudication").
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innovations applicable only to complex cases," such as the Judicial
Panel on Multidistrict Litigation3 2 and the corresponding Manual
for Complex Litigation.3 Others contend that the current rules are
adequate to the task of meeting any difficulties complex litigation
poses.34 Regardless, the belief that the "problem" of complex litiga-
tion persists inspired the American Law Institute to undertake its
Complex Litigation Project, 5 and it influences much of the aca-
demic literature on the topic.36 This paper tries to isolate a discrete
area within the "problem" of complex litigation-appellate re-
view-and offer a targeted solution drawn from existing bodies of
law.
B. Defining Complex Litigation
As mentioned above, defining the problem of complex litigation
can fill a book. In fact, many have struggled with the definition. 7
The most instructive effort comes from Jay Tidmarsh's lengthy arti-
cle, Unattainable Justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits
ofJudicial Power. After a careful review of past efforts to define the
31. Congress seems to adopt this view. For at least some areas ofjudicial management,
courts are statutorily authorized to apply "differential treatment" to complex cases. See 28
U.S.C. § 473(a)(1), (3) (2000).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2000) (creating the Judicial Panel for Multidistrict Litiga-
tion).
33. See FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) (1995).
34. Mark C. Weber, The Federal Civil Rules Amendments of 1993 and Complex Litigation: A
Comment on Transsubstantivity and Special Rules for Large and Small Federal Cases, 14 REv. LITIG.
113, 119-26 (1994) (arguing that the elements of judicial discretion built into the Federal
Rules adequately address the problems of complex litigation).
35. See AM. LAW INST., supra note 9.
36. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 881-82; Richard A. Nagareda, Turning From Tort to
Administration, 94 MICH. L. REv. 899 (1996); Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1688-89; Melissa A.
Waters, Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Procedure: Redefining Appellate Review for the Mass
Tort Era, 80 N.C. L. REV. 527 (2002); Ryan Danks, Creating a Form to Follow the Function: A
New Rule for Controlling Post-Judgment Masters (Jan. 15, 2002) (unpublished manuscript,
on file with author).
37. Professors Tidmarsh and Trangsrud report the shifting understanding of complex
litigation from various sources. TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 5, at 83-85. For example,
the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX AND MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION § 0.1 (1970) defined the phrase as
one or more related cases which present unusual problems and which require extraordi-
nary treatment." Its successor, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (SECOND) (1985),
deliberately refused to define the term. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 5, at 85. In
1994, the American Law Institute offered that all complex cases share two defining charac-
teristics: "the potential for relitigation ... , and ... enormous expenditure of resources."
AM. LAW INST., supra note 9, ch. 2 cmt. a. Finally, in 1995, the MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGA-
TION (THIRD) § 10.1 (1995) identified "judicial management" as complexity's "defining
characteristic."
38. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20.
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problem, Professor Tidmarsh concludes that complex litigation
consists of "[1] itigation in an adversarial system in which the judi-
cial power necessary to overcome the dysfunction of the lawyers,
the jury, or the parties results in procedural disparities that cause
substantively disparate outcomes among similarly situated parties,
claims, or transactions."39 The key element of this definition is 'ju-
dicial power necessary to overcome ... dysfunction. 40 As explored
above, parties (and lawyers acting on their behalf) ordinarily con-
trol the scope of litigation. 4' But sometimes this control is
dysfunctional. Although many defend the virtues of this party-
41centered adversarial system for other reasons, it is designed as a
means to effect justice.9 Inasmuch as it falls short of this, it be-
comes dysfunctional. Complex litigation refers to those cases
where judicial action is necessary to address the dysfunction that
arises from multiple claims, multiple parties, or some other form of
litigation "complexity."
In the case of joinder complexity, dysfunction comes in three
basic varieties. The first involves an insufficient fund, where the
number of and size of claims exceeds the funds available to satisfy
them." The simplest example of this is a mass disaster where the
defendant carries only one insurance policy. Dozens of injured
parties may have a claim for well more than the insurance
proceeds. If everyone pursues their claims individually, then "the
first claimant to obtain ... a judgment or to negotiate a settlement
might appropriate all or a disproportionate slice of the fund before
his fellow claimants were able to establish their claims."45 The
second situation involves the related problem of inconsistent legal
obligations.46 Instead of monetary claims that exceed the ability to
pay, this problem arises when one court orders a party to follow a
particular course of conduct and subsequent lawsuits seek to hold
the party to a different standard.47 In these first two situations,
39. Id. at 1801.
40. Id.
41. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
42. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 21, at 381-87 (discussing the importance of adversarial
advocacy and passive judges as "forms" necessary to adjudication).
43. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 235-42 (1971) (describing howjudicial pro-
cedures are an essential ingredient ofjustice and therefore of liberty).
44. SeeTidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1781; see also FED. R. Civ. P. 22(1) (allowing for join-
der when "claims are such that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple
liability").
45. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967); see also Chafee, su-
pra note 4, at 1311 ("The fund or limited liability is like a mince pie, which can not be
satisfactorily divided until the carver counts the number of persons at the table.").
46. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1781-82.
47. See id.
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bringing everyone into a single lawsuit permits the court to craft a
remedy that suits everyone's interests.48 The third form of joinder
complexity involves the inefficient re-litigation of similar claims,
such as in asbestos litigation, where new claimants assert essentially
the same claims over and over again, against the same defendants.
Professors Tidmarsh and Trangsrud argue that this type of case
should be thought of as "complicated," rather than "complex,"
because it does not involve the same kind of dysfunction as the
other two. 5 As an analytical matter, this is probably correct, but
many observers consider this a species of complex litigation, 51 and
these "complicated" cases also often involve increased exercises of
judicial power to overcome a perceived "dysfunction" in the
judicial system.52
C. Complex Litigation and Appellate Review
Existing procedural mechanisms do, of course, address the types
of complexity explored above. For example, one use of class ac-
tions under Rule 23(b) (1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
is to bring together all claimants to a "limited fund. 5 3 Similarly, if a
party's interest will be "impaired or impeded" by the result of a
lawsuit, she is ordinarily entitled to intervene in the case.54 Further,
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation exists precisely for the
purpose of capturing instances of inefficient re-litigation and con-
solidating them before a single court.55 But the mere availability of
judicial procedures does not overcome the complexities they are
48. See, e.g., Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755 (1989). In Martin, a group of black firefight-
ers obtained a judgment ordering the city of Birmingham, Alabama to remedy certain
discriminatory hiring practices. Id. at 758-60. Then, the Court permitted a group of white
firefighters, who had not been joined in the first suit, to challenge the scheme as reverse
discrimination. Id. at 769.Joining everyone in one suit would have avoided this problem.
49. See Hardy v. Johns-Mansville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334 (5th Cir. 1982) (rejecting an
attempt to bind asbestos manufacturers to a prior court decision holding that asbestos is, as
a matter of fact, unreasonably dangerous). In Hardy, the court commended the search for
innovative methods of resolving asbestos litigation, but refused to "elevate judicial expedi-
ence over considerations ofjustice and fair play." Id. at 348.
50. See TIDMARSH & TRANGSRUD, supra note 5, at 88--89.
51. See, e.g., AM. LAW INST., supra note 9, ch. 2 cmt. a (defining complex litigation as
"characterized by related claims dispersed in several forums," and "the potential for relitiga-
tion"); see also MARCUS & SHERMAN, supra note 10, at 104 ("Sometimes ... cases take on
complexities by virtue of their relationship to other cases.").
52. See, e.g., In mJoint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
In the Asbestos Litigation case, the judges of the Eastern and Southern Districts of New York
cooperated to bring more than 700 separate asbestos cases before a single judge.
53. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 815 (1999).
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 24.
55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) (2000).
[VOL. 41:2
Where Equity Meets Expertise
designed to address. Defining a "fund"5 6 or an "interest 57 is not
always easy. Moreover, individual litigants do not always utilize the
procedures necessary to overcome complexity.
Faced with this, judges respond in different ways. Some make an
active effort to solve the problems of complexity through creative
uses of existing procedures. 8 Others, concerned with docket man-
agement, try to keep complexity at bay by narrowing each case to
its simplest incarnation. Still others struggle to interpret the es-
sential legal questions that plague complex litigation.6° Then the
appellate courts weigh in on these "polycentric" problems and the
judges' efforts to manage them.6' A trial judge prone to simplifying
cases may reside in a circuit that takes an activist, complexity-
solving stance. Or a trial judge who advances a creative under-
standing of a "limited fund" may find that the appellate court
disagrees with her reasoning. These complications are a common
byproduct of our appellate system, and they are particularly likely
when dealing with novel or difficult questions of law.62 But in this
area of the law, one where "complexity" defines every case, the ju-
dicial system does not need the additional complications of a
traditional appellate relationship. And in analogous areas, the law
56. See Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 838-41 (analyzing the meaning of a "limited fund").
57. See Bustop v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. Rptr. 793, 795-96 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (ana-
lyzing the meaning of "interest" under a state version of Rule 24).
58. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 2010 (1997); see also infra Part II.
59. Courts that would follow this course can draw encouragement from FED. R. Civ. P.
42(b), which permits separate trials "in furtherance of convenience."
60. Two prominent asbestos cases illustrate this point. Both concern the difficult ques-
tion of the availability of settlement class actions under FED. R. Civ. P 23. In Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor 521 U.S. 591 (1997), the Supreme Court set aside a class-action global settle-
ment involving extensive and complicated negotiations between the attorneys. The District
Court had certified the settlement class and approved the settlement, only to have the Third
Circuit vacate the orders and the Supreme Court affirm. Id. at 597. At about the same time,
a different group of asbestos plaintiffs and defendants negotiated an even more complicated
global settlement. That dispute, which ultimately became Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S.
815 (1999), involved District Court certification of the class and approval of the settlement
after an eight-day-long fairness hearing, affirmance by the Fifth Circuit, vacation to recon-
sider in light of Amchem, subsequent re-affirmance by the Fifth Circuit, and ultimate reversal
by the United States Supreme Court. Id. at 828-30. But even these recent Supreme Court
pronouncements have not authoritatively resolved the question of the settlement class ac-
tion. In fact, the Amchem Court held that settlement class actions are not only proper, but
that the fact of settlement should be considered when ruling on class certification, Amchem,
521 U.S. at 619-20.
61. See, e.g., Cook v. Boorstin, 763 F.2d 1462, 1472 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (reversing a trial
court's denial of class certification despite claiming sympathy for the trial court's role in
making such decisions).
62. See cases cited supra notes 59-60.
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recognizes this consideration with modified notions of judicial re-
view.63 Complex litigation merits a similar modification.
II. TRIALJUDGES AND COMPLEX CASES:
"TEMPORARY ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES"
Complex litigation casts the trial judge in a new role. Professor
Tidmarsh's definition of the phrase recognizes this, 64 and the in-
sight dates at least to Professor Chayes,5 probably earlier. 6 Some
criticize this development,67 and even those who recognize its bene-
fits caution against adopting the "activist" judge as a generally
applicable model.6s In many respects, Abram Chayes articulated the
proper response to this debate years ago when he directed his at-
tention to "what [the] federal courts and particularly federal trial
judges are doing 'in fact.' 69 This paper takes a similar view: right
or wrong, American trial judges have become much more "mana-
gerial" in complex cases, and we ought to proceed from that
reality. Moreover, the movement toward managerial justice may not
be as foreign or as recent as critics imagine. In this Part, I explore
the phenomenon of the managerial judge70 through the lenses of
historical equity practice and modern administrative law proce-
dures.
A. Equity Conquered the Common Law
Most of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure derive from eq-
uity.7' Historically, equity differed from law in a key way:
63. See infra Part III.
64. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1801 (noting that complex litigation necessarily in-
volves untraditional exercises of "judicial power").
65. See Chayes, supra note 12 (analyzing changes to "The Role of the judge").
66. See Chafee, supra note 4, at 1331-32 (analyzing the "administrative problem pre-
sented by multiple suits involving common questions[,]" and concluding that "[a]ll that
remains is a practical task for the trial judge").
67. See, e.g.,Judith Resnik, ManagerialJudges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 376, 445 (1982).
68. See Minow, supra note 58, at 2033.
69. Chayes, supra note 12, at 1282.
70. Discussions of "managerial judges" often focus on the way judges exert uncharac-
teristic control over pretrial matters in complex cases. See, e.g., Minow, supra note 58, at 2012;
Resnik, supra note 67. My focus is on joinder determinations, but to the extent the judge
becomes more involved in these matters, it raises the same questions concerning the propri-
ety ofjudicial management.
71. See generally Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909 (1987) (reviewing historical
[VOL. 41:2
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"[c] ommon law was the more confining, rigid, and predictable sys-
tem; equity was more flexible, discretionary, and individualized.,
72
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure overwhelmingly adopted the
equitable mindset, to the exclusion of the common law perspec-
tive.73 Although some criticize this decision,4 the triumph of equity
is an important aspect of modern civil procedure.
Equitable procedures enjoy even greater dominance in complex
cases because, much like present-day complex litigation, "[t] he eq-
uity system did not revolve around the search for a single issue.
Multiple parties could, and often had to, be joined."75 Thus, the
present-day procedures associated most closely with complex litiga-
tion-such as class actions, party and issue joinder, and
76 dfn
interpleader-all derive from equity practice. In defending the
application of these features of equity, Zechariah Chafee ex-
plained, "unless the first lawsuit seems likely to be the last, the
courts should do their best to settle the dispute in one proceeding
in which the whole multitude can participate on one side together.
At common law this was impossible."77 But, "[t]he multiplicity of
suits should be enough to create equitable jurisdiction."7 8 Because
modern complex litigation often represents an effort to "make[]
one lawsuit grow where two [or more] grew before, 7 9 it is often
quite similar to a suit in equity.80
Given the similarities, we should expect equity's characteristics
to shine through in complex litigation. In particular, equity's his-
torical tolerance for multiple parties and multiple claims was able
to function only as a "less individualized justice ... result[ing] in
more discretionary power lodged in a single Chancellor.". Modem
courts continue to rely on broad judicial discretion in adjudicating
equity practice and tracing the roots of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to these equita-
ble procedures).
72. Id. at 920.
73. Id. at 922-26.
74. Id. at 914.
75. Id. at 919.
76. Id.; see also Waters, supra note 36, at 543 (discussing "modern aggregation devices
rooted in equity practice").
77. Chafee, supra note 4, at 1300 (footnote omitted).
78. Id. at 1302. Chafee's contention on this issue may strain the Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial. I know of no court that has fully adopted this understanding of equitable
jurisdiction, but detailed exploration of this topic falls outside the scope of this Article.
79. Id. at 1297.
80. Cf Weber, supra note 34, at 113-14 ("Equity cases were the complex litigation of
the nineteenth century ....").
81. Subrin, supra note 71, at 920 (emphasis added).
WINTER 2008]
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
suits in equity,8 2 and judicial innovators in complex cases often find
authority for their actions in the discretionary powers arising out of
the equitable nature of a complex lawsuit's structure.83
Even in complex cases that do not push the bounds of accepted
judicial practice, the influence of equity is well understood: "In the
mass tort regime, this historical goal of equity has taken on a whole
new meaning, as modern aggregation devices rooted in equity
practice make possible the aggregation, adjudication, and settle-
ment of thousands of individual claims in the same action."
84
Furthermore, courts recognize the discretionary nature of the
whole enterprise. As one appellate court explained,
[W]e ... sympathize with the district court's efforts to streamline the
enormous asbestos caseload it faces. None of what we say here is
meant to cast doubt on any possible alternative ways to avoid rein-
venting the asbestos liability wheel. We [invite] ... district courts to
attempt innovative methods for trying these cases."5
Thus, equity and the discretion it entails are essential back-
ground principles in complex litigation. Many observers have
recognized as much, 6 but some are troubled by the results. As
Stephen Subrin explains, in equity, "U]udges were given more
power.""' For him, this worked well enough as an exceptional prac-
82. See, e.g., R.R. Comm'n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500 (1941) (reviewing
the "exercise of the sound discretion, which guides the determination of courts of equity")
(quoting Beal v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941)).
83. See, e.g., In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Prods. Liab. Litig., 246 E3d 315 (3d Cir.
2001). In In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products, the court stated:
Settlement administration in a complex class action often requires courts to use their
equitable powers under Rule 23 to manage the disparate interests competing over a
finite pool of assets with which to satisfy the class.... The equitable powers of the
court may be invoked to deal with other problems that commonly arise during ad-
ministration of the settlement.
Id. at 321 (citing MANUAL FOR Complex Litigation (THIRD) § 30.47 (1995)). See also, e.g., In re
Joint E. & S. Dists. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 809 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991) (certifying a com-
plicated asbestos class action and noting that "[m]any equitable goals are served by class
treatment of mass tort claims"), vacated, 982 E2d 721 (2d Cir. 1992), modified, 993 F.2d 7 (2d
Cir. 1993); Asset Allocation & Mgmt. Co. v. W. Employers Ins. Co., 892 F.2d 566, 572 (7th
Cir. 1989) (holding that the power to prevent duplicative litigation is a "new power asserted
in order to facilitate the economical management of complex litigation," moving beyond
even traditional equitable powers).
84. Waters, supra note 36, at 543.
85. Hardy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 681 F.2d 334, 348 (5th Cir. 1982).
86. See, e.g., Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1805; Waters, supra note 36, at 530 (describing
how mass torts cases "rely heavily on the flexible equity practice that has long dominated
federal trial procedure"); Weber, supra note 34, at 124 ("Procedures derived from equity
practice could be expected to give judges the power to control the manner in which the
dispute is developed and presented.").
87. Subrin, supra note 71, at 920.
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tice, in concert with the default principles of the common law, but
it fails as a general framework for adjudication. 8 Lon Fuller, and
those who follow his lead, would probably agree. Fuller's view is
grounded in theoretical concerns, and it emphasizes the impor-
tance of a passive judicial officer at the root of rational
adjudication. This leaves little room for increasing judicial power
in the model of equity's Chancellor. More recently, Melissa Waters,
commenting on "Common Law Courts in an Age of Equity Proce-
dure,"9° reached a similar conclusion. She argued that the flexible
powers trial judges employ in mass torts cases must be carefully
controlled through stricter review and easier access to appellate
courts. 91
Each of these views represents a well-reasoned analysis of the
problems of increased judicial power rooted in equity and applied
to complex litigation. But that is not the entire picture. Modem
complex litigation is more than equity for the twenty-first century.
Increasingly, both the study and practice of this area of the law
draw on a legal field of more recent vintage: administrative law.9 As
such, before unraveling the "problem" of managerial judges, and
particularly of appellate review, one should also explore the rela-
tionship between complex litigation and the practice of
administrative law.
B. Adjudication Versus Administration
The rise of the administrative state in the American legal system
is a complex and interesting phenomenon. Instead of tracking its
history here, however, I wish to focus on a few salient features of
administrative law to examine how they resemble the "judicial
management" associated with complex litigation. First, administra-
tive agencies combine rule-making, adjudication, and traditional
executive powers in uncommon ways that diverge from our stan-
dard notions of separation of powers.3 Second, administrative
agencies exercise delegated power. Unlike other governmental or-
ganizations, whose powers derive more or less directly from the
88. Id. at 922-26.
89. See supra notes 42-43 and accompanying text.
90. See Waters, supra note 36.
91. Id. at 584-604.
92. See, e.g., Jonathan T. Molot, An Old Judicial Role for a New Litigation Era, 113 YALE
L.J. 27, 94 & n.296 (2003) (reviewing parallels between class action litigation and adminis-
trative law).
93. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., On the Danger of Wearing Two Hats: Mistretta and Morri-
son Revisited, 38 WM. & MARY L. REv. 417,421 (1997).
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Constitution, administrative agencies are generally creatures of
statute, with their powers subject to legislative grant and judicial
interpretation. Because of this, "[t] he primary purpose of adminis-
trative law is to keep administrative powers within their legal
bounds and to protect individuals against abuse of those powers.
9 4
Finally, administrative agencies grow out of a need for specialized
governance. As Bernard Schwartz and Roberto Corrada explain,
virtually every administrative agency in the United States is based
on the 1887 creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission: "In
countless instances, specialization to deal with specialized prob-
lems of administration has been provided in the same way it was in
1887." 9
The benefits of the administrative law model mirror many of
equity's benefits. By blending the executive, legislative, and judicial
functions, an administrative agency is more flexible and better
equipped to address the entirety of a complex problem. As Lon
Fuller explained, "[i]f we survey the whole field of adjudication
and ask ourselves where the solution of polycentric problems by
adjudication has most often been attempted, the answer is: in the
field of administrative law."96 It is no surprise, then, that "manage-
rial" trial judges begin to look and act like administrative agencies
when presiding over complex litigation. Martha Minow eloquently
explores this tendency in her commentary on Judge Jack
Weinstein, one of the most well-known judicial innovators in the
area of complex litigation.97 Professor Minow argues that Judge
Weinstein creates "temporary administrative agencies. ' 9"
The dangers inherent in administrative governance and its ana-
logical application to complex litigation also resemble the dangers
of equity. Specifically, both administrative governance and equity
jurisprudence concentrate a great deal of power in the relevant
official. 99 The legal system checks unbridled administrative power
94. BERNARD SCHWARTZ & ROBERTO L. CORRADA, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: A CASEBOOK 5
(5th ed. 2001).
95. Id. at 17.
96. Fuller, supra note 21, at 400.
97. See Minow, supra note 58.
98. Id. at 2011.
99. For purposes of this Article, that official is the judge, but note that judges in com-
plex cases sometimes employ more clearly "administrative" officials, such as special masters.
See FED. R. Civ. P 53; In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 94 ER.D. 173 (E.D.N.Y. 1982).
In these cases, judicial management of complex litigation resembles administrative law even
more closely and presents issues similar to those treated here. For a thoughtful review of the
use of special masters in complex litigation, see Danks, supra note 36.
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through a variety of mechanisms, including judicial review.'00 As I
explore in Part 11, however, judicial review of administrative action
is calibrated to respect the specific delegations of administrative
power. 0' Appellate review in complex litigation should be similarly
calibrated.
Part of the balance between administrative power and judicial
review grows out of recognition of agency expertise. As described
above, administrative agencies perform specialized governmental
functions. The agencies bring expertise to complicated areas of
policy and (arguably) thereby provide better governance than we
could achieve through a "generalist" legislative, executive, and
court system. Specialization can also operate as a check on the po-
tential abuses of power, in that policy may be more just if
administered by a body of specialists even if those specialists enjoy
a great deal of power. As one commentator explains, "the legiti-
macy of administrative agencies is often defended in terms of
expert legitimacy, on the ground that administrative agencies per-
form a primarily technical role, requiring expert knowledge, in
advancing the values and goals set forth in legislation."02 This is
not to say that all specialists are altruistic. Bureaucratic abuse of
power is not unknown, but technical expertise is one justification
for the power granted to administrative agencies.
Something similar occurs in complex litigation. In mass tort set-
tlement class actions, for example, complex litigation has
proceeded on the backs of "an elite group of private attorneys who
possess formidable expertise in the subject area,"' a development
that "parallels, in several salient respects, the rise of public admin-
istrative agencies. 00 4 Further, complex litigation is growing to
resemble administrative law not only because of specialist attor-
neys; it also relies on "specialist" judges.0 5 On questions ofjoinder,
for example, the law has long recognized the relative "expertise" of
100. See Christopher C. Taintor, Comment, Federal Agency Nonacquiescence: Defining and
Enforcing Constitutional Limitations on Bad Faith Agency Adjudication, 38 ME. L. REV. 185, 185
(1986).
101. See infra notes 124-130 and accompanying text.
102. Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for
International Environmental Law ? 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 596, 620 (1999).
103. Nagareda, supra note 36, at 938.
104. Id. at 938-39.
105. See Minow, supra note 58, at 2020-21 (describing Judge Weinstein's conduct as
"contextualized efforts to construct procedures tailored for a particular circumstance; judg-
ing for the situation involves generating temporary administrative structures responsive to
the claims at hand"); Richard L. Marcus, Tribute, The Agenda-Setter for Complex Litigation, 149
U. PA. L. REV. 1257, 1274 (2001) (praising Chief Judge Edward Becker of the Third Circuit
and exploring how, "across a spectrum of crucial issues in complex litigation,Judge Becker
has led the way and shaped the law").
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trial judges. In reviewing class certification, the most ambitious
form of joinder, one court explains, "the district court maintains
substantial discretion in determining whether to certify a class ac-
tion .... Implicit in this deferential standard is a recognition of
the essentially factual basis of the certification inquiry and of the
district court's inherent power to manage and control pending liti-
gation."10 6 Thus, in complex litigation, equity meets expertise: the
joinder rules vest the discretionary powers characteristic of a chan-
cellor in trial court judges, and because the trial court is more
expert in crafting the best structure for the lawsuit, complex litiga-
tion takes on the appearance of a "quasi-administrative
proceeding, conducted by the judge."07
III. A NEW (BORROWED) STANDARD OF REVIEW:
CHEVRON DEFERENCE
Identifying the judicial role in complex litigation with the tradi-
tional business of administrative agencies is not a new idea,' s but
my proposal differs by using this insight to re-evaluate the applica-
ble standard of appellate review. Even this idea has at least one
proponent. In 1996, Richard Nagareda argued that mass tort set-
tlement mechanisms contain many of the characteristics of
administrative agencies.' 9 In view of this, Nagareda proposed that
appellate courts review such settlements with a standard much like
the "hard look" doctrine of administrative law."0 Professor Na-
gareda's argument, however, rests on the premise that Chevron
deference does not fit complex litigation. He writes: "In the con-
text of mass torts, however, there is no obvious analogue to Chevron
review; no one has delegated to the mass tort bar the authority to
effect settlements of future claims through the vehicle of a class
106. Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402, 408 (5th Cir. 1998) (citations omit-
ted).
107. Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) (quoting 3B J. MooRE &
J. KENNEDY, MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 23.45 (1984)).
108. See, e.g., Fuller, supra note 21, at 400 ("If we survey the whole field of adjudication
and ask ourselves where the solution of polycentric problems by adjudication has most often
been attempted, the answer is: in the field of administrative law."); Minow, supra note 58, at
2020 ("Uludicial supervision of complex suits resembles administrative agency activity
... ."); Nagareda, supra note 36, at 902 ("I contend that the rise of such settlements in [class
action mass torts] mirrors the development of public administrative agencies . .."); Danks,
supra note 36 (analogizing, from the vantage point of complex litigation, the work of court-
appointed special masters to administrative agencies).
109. Nagareda, supra note 36, at 902.
110. Seeid. at945-52.
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action.""' Focusing exclusively on mass torts, and specifically on
settlement class actions, Nagareda may be correct. But if we place
mass torts inside the broader context of complex litigation, as de-
fined above, the analysis changes."' The standard of review
identified with Chevron is a proper analogue to trial judges' joinder
determinations in complex cases. In particular, Chevron requires
courts to take note of the authority specifically committed to an
agency when determining whether an action merits deference."3
Similarly, through their history in equity, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure commit broad discretionary authority to trial judges to
manage their cases, thereby meriting a similar measure of defer-
114
ence.
A. The Doctrine of Chevron Deference
In the now-famous case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, the United States Supreme Court announced a two-
part standard of review applicable to administrative agency deter-
minations."' Justice John Paul Stevens, writing for the Court,
explained, "[w]e have long recognized that considerable weight
should be accorded to an executive department's construction of a
statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer."1 6 In view of this, the
Chevron test requires a reviewing court to first look at "whether
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question.""7 If it has,
then Congress's command guides both the courts and the agen-
cies, and no deference is appropriate."8 But if the question is
ambiguous, courts proceed to the second step. Under this prong, if
the matter is explicitly or implicitly committed to the agency's au-
thority, then "a court may not substitute its own construction." 9
111. Id.at942n.166.
112. Further, since the completion of Nagareda's article in 1996, the utility of the mass
tort settlement class action has been seriously undermined. See Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp.,
527 U.S. 815 (1999) (reversing certification of another asbestos settlement class action);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997) (finding certification of an asbestos
global settlement class action improper).
113. See infra notes 125-128 and accompanying text.
114. See supra notes 83-85 and accompanying text.
115. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984).
116. Id. at 844.
117. Id. at 842.
118. See id. at 842-43.
119. Id. at 844.
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The courts have struggled to determine which types of agency
action merit Chevron deference,20 and academic commentators
continue to debate Chevron's meaning and how the courts are us-
ing it.12 ' Exploring these concerns in depth would move beyond
the present discussion of complex litigation, but some general
characteristics deserve attention. The standard interpretation of
Chevron, and the one most often encountered in administrative law
courses, is that it was meant to compel a greater degree of judicial
deference to administrative action. In recent years, however, "[a]
strong revisionist view has emerged, interpreting Chevron as less
deferential than many initially assumed." 23 This shift explains the
uncertainty of post-Chevron case law and the overwhelming quantity
of academic literature on the doctrine. 24 If scores of administrative
law commentators are unable to develop a uniform construction of
Chevron deference, neither can I do so here. Further, if Chevron
deference is a doctrine with uncertain parameters, it will do little
to advance predictability and fairness in complex litigation. For
these reasons, I will focus more on the theory (perhaps the myth) of
Chevron, rather than the doctrine in practice.
Regardless of the truth of the "revisionist view," many under-
stand Chevron to encourage judicial deference. The doctrine of
Chevron deference continues to receive this construction,125 and it is
this myth that informs my discussion. This more deferential inter-
pretation is rationally based on the language of the opinion itself.
Justice Stevens wrote: "the regulatory scheme is technical and
complex, the agency considered the matter in a detailed and rea-
soned fashion, and the decision involves reconciling conflicting
policies.' '2 6 In such a case, where "a challenge to an agency con-
struction of a statutory provision ... really centers on the wisdom
120. See, e.g., Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576 (2000) (holding that agency
opinion letters do not warrant Chevron deference).
121. See, e.g., Charles H. Koch, Jr., Judicial Review of Administrative Discretion, 54 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 469 (1986); Gary S. Lawson, Reconceptualizing Chevron and Discretion: A Com-
ment on Levin and Rubin, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 1377 (1997); Ronald M. Levin, The Anatomy of
Chevron: Step Two Reconsidered, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1253 (1997); Edward L. Rubin, Discre-
tion and Its Discontents, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1299 (1997).
122. Levin, supra note 121, at 1256.
123. Id. at 1257-58.
124. For a sampling of Chevron literature, Professor Levin refers the reader to John F.
Coverdale, Court Review of Tax Regulations and Revenue Rulings in the Chevron Era, 64 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 35, 36 n.3 (1995), "[f]or a non-exhaustive list of forty-seven 'principal' articles
on Chevron." Levin, supra note 121, at 1253 n.2.
125. See, e.g., Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562 (2007) (analyzing
Chevron as the Supreme Court opinion that increased the level of deference given by courts
to administrative agencies).
126. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(footnotes omitted).
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of the agency's policy ... the challenge must fail.", 27 This recog-
nizes the distinctive roles of courts and agencies in our system:
administrative agencies are expert in their fields and politically ac-
countable, while federal judges are remote from the factual
backdrop and removed from the political system. 2 ' This reality en-
courages a policy of strong deference.
29
Despite the compelling reasons for judicial deference, Chevron
recognizes that judges must exercise some measure of judicial re-
view. As emphasized above, the tendency for great concentrations
of power is one of the principal objections to the administrative
state. 130 Judicial review provides an essential check on that potential
for abuse. Accordingly, Chevron holds that an agency determina-
tion, even if made pursuant to an explicit Congressional delegation
of policy-making power, should be set aside if it is "arbitrary, capri-
cious, or manifestly contrary to the statute."''1 Reviewing courts
remain responsible for interpreting statutes, but courts also defer
when administrative agencies non-arbitrarily execute their own
important responsibilities.
B. Applying Chevron to Complex Litigation
The Chevron model is easily applicable to complex litigation, par-
ticularly to trial judges' determinations on joinder. Like a
legislative policy committed to agency expertise, the various aggre-
gation devices available in complex litigation are committed to the
sound discretion of the trial judge.3 2 As reviewed above, these
127. Id. at 866.
128. See id. at 865-66.
129. Id. at 845 ("If this choice represents a reasonable accommodation of conflicting
policies that were committed to the agency's care by the statute, we should not disturb it
unless it appears from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is not one
that Congress would have sanctioned." (quoting United States v. Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382-
83 (1961))).
130. See supra notes 93, 99 and accompanying text.
131. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984).
132. See, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 868 (1999) (BreyerJ., dissenting)
("[D]istrict courts have 'broad power and discretion ... with respect to matters involving the
certification' of class actions." (citing Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 345 (1979)));
Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 872 n.28 (9th Cir. 2001) ("Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23 provides district courts with broad discretion to determine whether a class should be
certified"); Painewebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 201 (6th Cir. 2001) ("[W]e must affirm
the district court's Rule 19(a) analysis unless we are 'left with a definite and firm conviction
that the trial court committed a clear error of judgment.' ") (citation omitted); Dye v. Jack-
son, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 31548, at *6 (6th Cir. 1998) (holding that a decision to join
parties under Rule 20(a) rests within the trial courts discretion); Shaw v. Hunt, 154 F.3d 161,
168 (4th Cir. 1998) ("District courts, of course, are vested with substantial discretion to deny
permissive intervention where inappropriate, thus controlling those who as parties may
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discretionary powers and the flexibility they entail derive from the
long history of equity.33 Additionally, in the "contemporary, com-
plex litigation-laden legal system,' '134 joinder determinations are
one of the many ways that "managerial" trial judges shape the
course of pending litigation in order to bring it to a successful
conclusion. 135 When a lawsuit is truly complex, 136 that is, "polycen-
tric, "13 the trial judge's managerial efforts take on an
administrative character. '3 For these reasons, the long-recognized
analogy between complex litigation and administrative law1
3
1
should be pushed even further. Courts reviewing trial judges' rul-
ings on aggregation 40 should, as with agency determinations, apply
the standard of review known as Chevron deference.
My proposal would replace abuse of discretion review, where
applicable, and it would significantly undercut de novo review when
141applied tojoinder determinations. Consistent with "Step One" of
potentially be entitled to fees."); Hedberg v. Darlington County Disabilities & Special Needs
Bd., 1997 U.S. App. LEXIS 36075, at *8 (4th Cir. 1997) ("We note that district courts are
generally given broad discretion to decide the scope of a civil action.").
133. See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
134. In re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 783 (3d
Cir. 1995).
135. See generally Minow, supra note 58 (assessing Judge Jack Weinstein's creative use of
procedures in complex cases). For just one telling example of this, see Aaberg v. ACandS,
Inc., 152 ER.D. 498 (D. Md. 1994), in which the Court, by the stroke of a pen, changed the
case from a 1000-plaintiff dispute to a one-plaintiff case.
136. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1801 (defining complex litigation as "(l]itigation in
an adversarial system in which the judicial power necessary to overcome the dysfunction of
the lawyers, the jury, or the parties results in procedural disparities that cause substantively
disparate outcomes among similarly situated parties, claims, or transactions").
137. See Fuller, supra note 21, at 395.
138. See id. at 400.
139. See, e.g., id. at 400 ("If we survey the whole field of adjudication and ask ourselves
where the solution of polycentric problems by adjudication has most often been attempted,
the answer is: in the field of administrative law."); Minow, supra note 58, at 2020 ("Uludicial
supervision of complex suits resembles administrative agency activity.... ."); Nagareda, supra
note 36, at 902 ("I contend that the rise of such settlements in [class action mass torts] mir-
rors the development of public administrative agencies ... ."); Danks, supra note 36
(analogizing, from the vantage point of complex litigation, the work of court-appointed
special masters to administrative agencies).
140. When I talk ofjoinder or aggregation determinations, I am referring, in the main,
to decisions under Rules 19 through 24 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. I have,
however, deliberately left the phrase undefined because other types of rulings may also
amount to joinder determinations. Some examples include decisions to transfer under 28
U.S.C. § 1404, determinations of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation under 28
U.S.C. § 1407, rulings on statutory interpleader under 28 U.S.C. § 1335, and possibly even
various rulings arising out of a Bankruptcy proceeding. I suspect there are many other pos-
sibilities.
141. Reviewing courts sometimes give lip service to the trial judge's discretion while si-
multaneously characterizing the joinder ruling as one involving a "question of law," thereby
triggering broader, de novo review. See, e.g., Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151 F.3d 402,
408 (5th Cir. 1998) ("We note at the outset that the district court maintains substantial dis-
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Chevron, appellate courts would still exercise a kind of de novo re-
view, but it would be limited to ascertaining the unambiguous
commands of the statute or procedural rule in question. 42 Assum-
ing the trial determination satisfied this standard, the appellate
court would proceed to "Step Two," evaluating the decision to
make sure that it is not "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly con-
trary to the statute."'4 3 But if the ruling does not run afoul of this
deferential standard, then it should be affirmed.
In practice, this kind of Chevron review may not be functionally
very different from abuse of discretion review,144 which recognizes
that "[i]f reasonable men could differ as to the propriety of the
action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial
court abused its discretion." 45 Alternatively, applying Chevron to
complex litigation may vastly alter the relationship between trial
and appellate courts. Administrative law provides us with a useful
doctrine, but it does not provide a clear and predictable applica-
tion of that doctrine.' Because I advocate borrowing the theory,
rather than the practice, we have no reliable information to help
predict the effects of this modified judicial review. But that does
not undercut its value. The benefit of adopting Chevron for com-
plex cases does not lie in fewer reversals or fewer appeals. Instead,
appellate courts should apply Chevron deference to joinder deter-
minations because it will clarify their relationship with trial courts
in this complex area of the law. It will also force appellate courts to
draw clear lines between the respective realms of discretion and
unambiguous legislative command in our procedural aggregation
devices. 47 Finally, adopting Chevron will respect what trial judges
cretion in determining whether to certify a class action .... Whether the district court ap-
plied the correct legal standard in reaching its decision on class certification, however, is a
legal question that we review de novo.").
142. Cf Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
143. Id. at 844.
144. See Pierce v. Underwood, 487 U.S. 552 (1988). In Underwood, the Court recognized
that even outside of the administrative law context trial courts sometimes face "multifarious
and novel question [s], little susceptible, for the time being at least, of useful generalization."
Id. at 562. In such situations, the Court formulated an abuse of discretion standard, id.,
which one commentator calls an extension of Chevron "to interpretations of law in civil mat-
ters." Martha S. Davis, Standards of Review: Judicial Review of Discretionary Decisionmaking, 2 J.
App. PRAC. & PROCESS 47, 64 (2000).
145. Delno v. Mkt. St. Ry., 124 F.2d 965, 967 (9th Cir. 1942).
146. See supra notes 119-123 and accompanying text. For a further review of the uncer-
tainty of Chevron's application, see generally Davis, supra note 144, at 62-67.
147. At present, those lines are significantly blurred. Somejoinder decisions are treated
as discretionary, others are given de novo review, and for others, it depends on the Circuit.
Compare McVay v. W. Plains Serv. Corp., 823 F.2d 1395 (10th Cir. 1987) (holding that Rule 19
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are doing "in fact";148 it will better reflect the characteristics of
complex litigation: where equity meets expertise.
C. Objections and Concerns with Transplanting the Chevron Model
One immediate objection to my proposal concerns the potential
for unchecked power in the hands of trial judges. As explored
above, one defining characteristic of complex litigation is the in-
creased role of the judge.4 This troubles many,150 and some believe
that our system best responds to the phenomenon of the "manage-
rial judge" by maintaining tight appellate-court control.'" Rule
23 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure implicitly adopts this
viewpoint by providing for interlocutory review of district court de-
terminations on the question of class-action certification. 15And
some academic commentators also suggest that complex cases re-
quire closer supervision from the courts of appeals.
153
At bottom, I simply disagree with this. Judicial review of adminis-
trative action is an essential ingredient in the protection against
concentrations of power. Yet, administrative law doctrine recog-
nizes the relative expertise of administrative agencies and
therefore applies a deferential standard of review to decisions
made within that expertise. Applying Chevron to complex litigation
would simply be a correlative development. Moreover, this Article
has only sought to demonstrate the propriety of that correlation,
not to praise the reality of the "managerial judge." Chevron-based
review could apply to aggregation decisions even in a system that
limits trial judges' power. If Professor Marcus is correct thatjudicial
discretion should not drive consolidation decisions and that trial
determinations are reviewed for abuse of discretion), withJanney Montgomery Scott, Inc. v.
Shepard Niles, Inc., 11 F.3d 399 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that "necessary party" determina-
tion under Rule 19 was a conclusion of law subject to plenary review).
148. Chayes, supra note 12, at 1282.
149. See supra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 2, at 897-901 (arguing that more precise guidelines
should govern trial judges' consolidation decisions); Resnik, supra note 67, at 445 ("I want to
take away trial judges' roving commission ... ."); see also Subrin, supra note 71 (arguing that
our current equity-dominated procedures disserve important goals of our legal system).
151. See, e.g., Waters, supra note 36.
152. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) ("A court of appeals may in its discretion permit an appeal
from an order of a district court granting or denying class action certification under this
rule. ... ").
153. E.g., Waters, supra note 36, at 591-602 (arguing for "The Expanded Use of Super-
visory and Advisory Mandamus"); see also Harlon Leigh Dalton, Taking the Right to Appeal
(More orLess) Seriously, 95 YALE L.J. 62, 106 n.149 (1985) (outlining a scheme of more restric-
tive rights to appeal, but concluding that more review is required in complex litigation).
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judges need clearer guidelines,1,5 4 Chevron can still apply. Under
such a system, Step One of the test, which recognizes that both trial
and appellate courts must follow unambiguous legislative com-
mands, would control most appeals. 55 Similarly, even if appellate
review should be widely available in complex cases, as Professor
Waters argues, 156 that does not mean that appellate courts must ex-
ercise searching and critical review. Thus, while critics of the
"managerial judge" argue from a different vantage point than this
Article, their views are not necessarily inconsistent with the adop-
tion of Chevron deference.
A more subtle attack on this proposal would highlight the dif-
ferences between administrative law and complex litigation. While
it is true that complex cases sometimes blur the lines between ad-
ministration and adjudication, 57 trial courts are not administrative
agencies. Part of the Chevron rationale recognizes that administra-
tive agencies are not only expert; they are also politically
accountable. 5 When the question is one of policy, it makes sense
that un-elected judges should defer to the decisions of a political
branch of the government. But trial judges are no more politically
accountable than courts of appeals. In other words, political ac-
countability really does not come into play in complex litigation. It
is a feature of administrative procedure that may offer some expla-
nation for the deference afforded by reviewing courts in that
sphere, but it simply does not affect deferential review in complex
litigation one way or the other. Moreover, the political accountabil-
ity of administrative agencies may be exaggerated. During the same
time period as the Chevron case, Peter L. Strauss argued that the
President must exercise greater control over administrative agen-
cies. 5 9 According to Strauss, Presidential control is essential
because agencies "lack the political accountability and the intellec-
tual and fiscal resources" to effectively balance competing policy
interests1 ° Political accountability is a difficult concept, but like
federal judges, agency administrators are not elected.
154. Marcus, supra note 2, at 897-901.
155. See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984) ("If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well
as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.").
156. Waters, supra note 36, at 591-602.
157. See supra notes 95-105 and accompanying text.
158. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865 ("While agencies are not directly accountable to the
people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices .. ").
159. See Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984).
160. Id. at 663.
WINTER 2008] 443
University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform
Similarly, some may challenge the analogy between authority
delegated to administrative agencies under their applicable statu-
tory schemes and the discretionary authority "delegated" to trial
courts under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. When Richard
Nagareda concluded that Chevron has no analogue in mass torts
cases, 61 he was relying in part on this rationale. According to Na-
gareda, trial courts do not enjoy delegated authority like
administrative agencies.'62 As such, perhaps they should not be en-
titled to the same deferential standard of review. This is a potent
analysis, but it is not sufficient to defeat the proposal. At least with
respect to aggregation decisions, which have been the focus of this
Article, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do delegate a degree
of authority to trial judges.6 3 By applying Chevron review in such
cases, appellate courts would give equal respect to the delegated
powers of both trial courts and administrative agencies.
One final concern centers on trans-substantivity. According to
Roger Trangsrud, the American judicial system is designed to use
common procedures for all types of cases.'6 By advocating a differ-
ent standard of appellate review for complex cases, this Article
arguably offends the principle of trans-substantivity. 165 But my pro-
posal also draws on a long history of Anglo-American law and
politics. Even if it offends some sense of philosophical purity, it is
not a radical departure from accepted practices. Further, I note
(without entering the debate) that some "[c]ritics claim that the
federal courts are in 'crisis' . .properly charged to . .. reliance
,066upon one trans-substantive set of rules for all kinds of cases ....Trans-substantivity standing alone does not end the discussion.
CONCLUSION
Abram Chayes was one of the first to recognize that what we now
call complex litigation casts the trial judge in a new role.167 More
recently, Jay Tidmarsh explained this reality as arising out of the
161. Nagareda, supra note 36, at 942 n.166.
162. Id.
163. See supra notes 8l, 82, and 131.
164. Roger Trangsrud, Federalism and Mass Tort Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2263, 2271
(2000).
165. See Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1808-09 (arguing that special procedural rules for
big or complex cases should be rejected in favor of trans-substantivity).
166. Judith Resnik, Failing Faith: Adjudicatory Procedure in Decline, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 494,
494-95 (1986).
167. See Chayes, supra note 12, at 1284.
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dysfunction of the lawyers and parties in complex cases." But
judges are not without an historical guide in this new territory.
Most instances of judicial power concerning party structure and
joinder draw on the equitable powers of discretion, many of which
are codified in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. This has pro-
vided a strong basis for aggregation in complex cases because
"equity delights to do justice and not by halves."069 Complex litiga-
tion's new "managerial judge" also resembles the practice of
administrative agencies, and the expertise of agencies within their
field resembles the aggregation expertise of trial judges implied by
the discretionary powers they exercise. As such, trial judges' join-
der determinations merit a similar standard of appellate review:
the standard of Chevron deference.
This approach does not solve, or even address, the problem of
trans-substantivity, nor does it remove the dysfunction that gives
rise to complexity. But it responds to an additional layer of com-
plexity that infects modern litigation of big cases. When faced with
the difficultjoinder problems of a complex case, Zechariah Chafee
recognized long ago that "[a]ll that remains is a practical task for
the trial judge, not very different from that which confronts the
prospective traveller [sic] in deciding whether to put his belong-
ings into one trunk or several suitcases.' ' 70 Our system instructs the
'judge to turn his thoughts to the best method of achieving satis-
factory justice .... ""' And on such practical tasks, the appellate
courts should defer.
168. Tidmarsh, supra note 20, at 1801.
169. Weber, supra note 34, at 121 (citing EDWARD D. RE, CASES AND MATERIALS ON REME-
DIES 43 (2d ed. 1987)).
170. Chafee, supra note 4, at 1332.
171. Id.
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